Abstract: Policy and research on European cyber-security remains formative compared to leaders in the field like China and the United States. This article evaluates the European Union (EU) as a cyber-security actor, asking fundamental questions concerning the EU's combination of prominence and obscurity, especially its limitations and prospects. Who and what is going to dominate the European response to cyber-security in the future? These questions are examined within the larger framework of liberal intergovernmentalism. The EU also is compared to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a point of reference to further understand the limitations and challenges ahead for the EU. Two major factors limit the EU as a cyber-security actor: its intergovernmental character, and the lack of collective vision on cyber-security with the EU and between member states. To play an important role in shaping cyberspace and cyber-security, the EU cannot treat the internet as simply a communication tool or trading platform. Cooperation and capacity-building measures are needed to allow EU member states to surpass mere coordination of their respective national cyber-security strategies. To succeed as a cyber-power, the EU should adapt new and different forms of cyber-power, from the compulsory through the institutional, to the structural and productive. Otherwise, coordination of national strategies for cyber-security of EU member states is the most the EU as an actor can aim for.
cyber-security is treated as a new and challenging field on its own regardless of national references.
This article evaluates the European Union as a cyber-security actor. Specifically, it asks fundamental questions concerning the EU's combination of prominence and obscurity, especially its limitations and prospects. Who and what is going to dominate the European response to cyber-security in the future? These questions will be examined within the larger framework of liberal intergovernmentalism. The European Union is also compared to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as a point of reference to further understand the limitations and challenges ahead for the EU.
Above all, the European Union suffers from lack of collective vision on cybersecurity. This analysis shows two major factors that limit the European Union as an actor in the field of cyber-security. First and most fundamental is the intergovernmental character of the European Union. At present, the EU is best characterized as a particularly intense form of intergovernmental cooperation, with some pooling and delegating of sovereignty to facilitate common aims and objectives. 6 Second is the fundamental lack of collective vision of cyber-security on the part of the European Union and its member states.
For the EU to play an important role in shaping cyberspace and cyber-security, it cannot treat the internet as simply a communication tool or trading platform. Cooperation and capacity-building measures are needed to allow EU member states to surpass mere coordination of their respective national cyber-security strategies. To succeed as a cyber-power, the EU should adapt new and different forms of cyber-power, from the compulsory through the institutional, to the structural and productive. Understanding of Cyber-Security: A Lack of Conceptual Clarity?
As Lior Tabansky observes, cyberspace is composed of all the computerized networks in the world, as well as 'end points' that are connected to the network and controlled through it. 8 This space is increasingly accessed by mobile rather than stationary devices. As such, cyberspace is composed of three layers: the infrastructure (physical layer such as storage devices, processors, etc.), software (computer systems and applications that interact with one another), and data held by the machines. 9 This still not fully explored environment presents fundamental challenges for the conceptualization of cybersecurity. Consequently it is not an easy task to elicit the understanding of cyber-security in the case of the European Union. Many EU member states have their own cyber-security strategies and their own conceptualizations of cyber-security.
The EU as a whole is not entirely clear on the notion. The EU Cyber Security Strategy -Open, Safe and Secure does not include a definition of cyber-security. One has to elicit this meaning from publications of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA).
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For its own purposes, ENISA defines cyber-security as ' ... the protection of information, information systems, infrastructure and the applications that run on top of it from those threats that are associated with a globally connected environment' . 11 Importantly it includes the basic characteristics of cyberspace: a wholly man-made environment that partly exists in physical form -information hardware (infrastructure of many kinds) and information software (that effectively enables social relations). Part of the understanding of cyber-security in this case relies on threats that emanate from the global environment. These threats are specified as cybercrime, cyber espionage and cyber warfare. 12 This seems rather general and superficial.
Particular EU member states might offer much deeper understandings of cybersecurity specified in the form of national cyber-security strategies. However, according to ENISA data, only 15 EU member states actually have national cyber-security strategies. 13 The remaining 12 do not have dedicated strategies, so they address cyber-security through their respective national security strategies, if at all. Their national narratives differ from case to case. Estonia, one of the most computerized societies, emphasizes the necessity of a secure cyberspace in general and focuses on information systems. Their recommended measures are of a civil character and concentrate on regulation, education, and cooperation. 14 The United Kingdom, on the other hand, in its 2011 document stresses its role as a trade partner:
... concentrating on the national objectives linked to evolving cyber security: making the UK the major economy of innovation, investment and quality in the field of ICT and by this to be able to fully exploit the potential and benefits of cyberspace. The objective is to tackle the risks from cyberspace like cyberattacks from criminals, terrorists and states in order to make it a safe space for citizens and businesses. 15 Herein lies the fundamental weakness of the European response to cyber threats. There is no coherent European understanding of what the notion of cyber-security should include.
Consequently, conceptualization differences are more than likely to produce different approaches to respective national capabilities catalogues. Such inconsistencies, when reinforced by national security narratives and traditional sovereignty claims, are more than likely to leave the EU toothless in the future.
NATO's understanding of cyber-security tends to be narrower, focusing on the functional aspects of the organization:
The main focus of the NATO Policy on Cyber Defence is on the protection of NATO networks and on cyber defence requirements related to national networks that NATO relies upon to carry out its core tasks: collective defence and crisis management. 16 As a military alliance based on collective defence, epitomized by Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO has incorporated thinking about cyber-security mainly in terms of national and collective security. The narrative is more pertinent to traditional security, military based and nationally provided. Such a narrow conceptualization, heavily influenced by the United States, seems more effective for actual capacity-building. The major point is that NATO in its official doctrine links cyber-security to the alliance's fundamental goals:
preservation of security of its members and coordinated assistance, should an attack take place. Effectively speaking, that means invoking Article 5.
Coordination vs Cooperation: The Structural Limitations of the EU
As a sui generis institution, the European Union proves to be a challenge for security experts.
It is an actor in international relations, especially since the In that sense, the EU can be conceptualized as an institutional cyber-power, a power that rests on indirect control of one actor's manoeuvring field through third party institutions. The most powerful actors are able to set norms and standards that ultimately shape the environment in which they and all other actors exist and through which they try to arrive at their goals. 23 Consequently, this part of the article will address two elementary avenues for an institution such as the EU to shape its institutional component of cyber-power: international cooperation, and facilitation of member states' approaches to cyber-security threats.
EU as a Global Cooperation Institutional Agent?
When dealing with global security threats and challenges, such as those in the cyber domain, it is almost a cliche to note that the response on the part of national governments needs to cut across traditional lines of organizational structures. The EU Parliament, the Commission and ENISA certainly realize that without international cooperation, including a high level of institutionalization and socialization alike, an effective EU response to cyber-security threats has limited prospects. Cooperation, therefore, should not only include EU member states but other major stakeholders like China or the United States. Such cooperation will definitely be easier when it comes to cybercrime, but not when regarding cyber espionage or cyber-attacks, which most states tend to treat as forms of economic competition.
Cooperation between the European Union and the United States developed under the general framework of transatlantic cooperation in cyber-security. 24 In particular, the EU -US Working Group on Cyber-Security and Cyber-Crime has been established. 25 The focus is on organizing events like that on 12 June 2012, devoted to gathering all potential intermediaries together to exchange experiences from both sides. 26 The alliance between these two is vital, as both are major shareholders in international (cyber-)security, generating a huge volume of electronic trade or running critical infrastructure that is highly dependent on computer systems.
Awareness-raising exercises, as well as experience-sharing, are important, but fundamental problems limit their effectiveness. Four problems stand out. First is the lack of clarity on the institutional side. As mentioned earlier, the NATO Rapid Reaction Team (RRT) focuses more on the American side of the Atlantic. The United States has signed and ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Cyber Crime, which conveys a common commitment to punish perpetrators and to deter cyber threats. 27 But some EU members, like Greece and Poland, have not. 28 Secondly, there is an essential problem with the lack of a commonly agreed definition of cyber defence among EU members as well as between the EU and the US.
Thirdly, as James Lewis and Heather Conley observe, recent lack of progress in effective cyber-security cooperation is coupled with the National Security Agency (NSA) spying revelations that have created an environment of transatlantic uncertainty and distrust. 29 Finally, there is the question of the International Treaty on Cyberwar. As much as the idea is supported by some EU member states, it gets little support from the American administration.
As Richard Clarke concludes, depending on the agreed definition of cyber warfare, a global cyber treaty might limit the United States from carrying out activities like cyber espionage, 'but it is extremely doubtful that some other nations would in fact follow its provisions' . 30 Worse still, the document would have to be channelled through the United Nations, which is notorious for slow responsiveness to pressing threats.
International law itself is outdated, with no clear vision among the international community as to how it should encapsulate cyberwar. 31 As Marry O'Connell observes, existing international law on the use of force is largely irrelevant when it comes to cyberspace since the former is mostly conceived of as space for communications and economic activity. 32 Therefore the relevant law should logically be law on economic rights. By extension, the international law on self-defence and the use of force is not directly applicable to the cyber domain. 33 It is often forgotten that the UN Charter was drafted during a time when the internet was unimaginable, and the most advanced equipment in the realm of computation and information were probably code machines like Enigma, used by Germany during the Second World War, and huge computing machines that took up whole rooms. 34 As for other major stakeholders, the EU has recently been pursuing the issue, for example in cyber-security talks with Chinese officials. The Joint Press Communique of the 14th EU-China summit of 14 February 2012 recognizes the importance of 'deepening understanding and trust on cyber issues' . 35 What this means in practice is that China and the European Union will set up a China-EU Cyber Taskforce. The aims of the taskforce seem moderate: addressing common cyber threats through enhanced bilateral exchanges and cooperation. It is also supposed to promote and develop technologies related to information and communication security, with a view to fostering economic and social development. 36 Commentators question the effectiveness of the taskforce, pointing to its confidence-building-like function rather than actually reducing cybercrime. 37 The basic problem is that China and the EU have different concepts of cyber-security and the cyber realm in general. 
Coordination of National and Private Stakeholders' Responses in the Case of

Cyber-Attacks
As the EU' s prime institution for exchange of information and best practices in information security, ENISA assists member states with their own national cyber-security strategies. For this purpose, a Good Practice Guide was finalized in 2012. 43 The European Commission encourages energy, transport, and financial companies in the EU to invest more in their cyber-security and to report breaches that could compromise their security. 44 Pertinent to the role and significance of 'critical infrastructure', private entities are part of the same system, which can only be as strong as its weakest element. 45 Therefore the Commission plans to extend security breach notifications to new industries other than telecommunications companies and internet firms, which in Europe are already subject to reporting obligations. 46 On top of that, the EU legal system already stipulates that illegally accessing and interfering with computers, servers, and data is punishable by criminal law. 47 It also specifically aims to address and punish those who build, use, and sell tools and software designed to carry out cyber-attacks (including criminal groups that launch malware and botnets) against sensitive information infrastructure in EU countries. In this regard the directive of the European Parliament and the Council on attacks against information systems introduces a specific combination of non-legislative measures that focus on cross-border law enforcement and public-private cooperation and the introduction of specific targeted (that is, limited) legislation to prevent largescale attacks against information systems.
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One of the most advanced actions to date is the organization of 'Cyber Europe 2014', an exercise claimed to be the biggest European cyber-attack simulation. 49 The scenario revolved around large-scale cyber-incidents that affected all participating countries. 
NATO as a Platform for Cyber Cooperation
EU institutions tend to act as facilitators of the coordination of national responses, much along the lines of intergovernmentalism. 51 As a military alliance, NATO is based on the clear commitment of its members to collective security and common defence. NATO has greatly incorporated its thinking about cyber-security into its security policy. Two differences stand out that make NATO better suited as a security agent in cyberspace. It understands cyber-security more narrowly than the EU, and much more in relation to the basic functions of the alliance. And it has established its own NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) for day-to-day activity and mitigation measures.
The organization has a clear road map that stipulates practical steps to be taken as well as concrete commitments by its members to build real cyber defence capabilities. The NATO Action Plan is strategic in its approach to building real capacity, inasmuch as it is supposed to be adaptive and goal oriented. In practical terms this means that NATO has embarked on the creation of minimum requirements for those national information systems that are critical for carrying out NATO's core tasks: assisting allies in achieving a minimum level of cyber defence in order to reduce vulnerabilities to national critical infrastructure; fully integrating cyber defence into the NATO Defence Planning Process; defining cyber defence requirements for non-NATO troop-contributing nations; enhancing early warning, situational awareness, and analysis capabilities; and finally, encouraging NATO and allies to draw on expertise and support from the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. 52 The two cyber defence activities that top the list, as defined by the Alliance, are assisting individual allies and integrating cyber defence into their Defence Planning Process. 53 The former focuses mainly on protecting the communication systems owned and operated by the Alliance.
National critical infrastructure is still protected at the national level; NATO declares its readiness to assist its members in building up much-needed resources but also requires them to provide and maintain a reliable and secure supporting infrastructure. This means that national and Alliance cyber defence planning activities are to be harmonized to meet agreed targets. Additionally, cyber defence has been integrated into the Alliance's Smart Defence initiative, whih is based on the logics of synergy and is designed to streamline the process of developing capabilities that would not be possible to achieve alone.
In 2007, Estonia experienced a cyber-attack that briefly affected much of the Estonian population, and caused tangible economic losses such as Estonia Hansbank' s reported loss of over USD 1 million. 54 This was a wakeup call that compelled states to treat cyberspace in strategic terms. 55 Partly in consequence, Estonia hosts the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence
Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn. The centre is responsible for exercises that allow the participants to test skills to fend off a real attack. 56 The 'Locked Shields' exercise involves governmental and non-governmental aid organizations in an imagined country facing an insurgency that is targeting their IT systems. 57 The CCDCOE's wideranging responsibilities also include contributing to development of cyber defence practices and standards with NATO, its members, candidate and Partnership for Peace countries, and contributing to development of NATO policies on cyber defence. 58 The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare is the Centre's most acclaimed publication, focused in particular on the international law relevant to this field. 59 NATO, as a military alliance, defines cyber-security in a narrow way that relates mainly to its basic roles. The Alliance also focuses more on creation of real cyber capabilities and a feasible road map. Its role is more to facilitate cooperation and interoperability, compared to that of the European Union, which is mainly a facilitator of intergovernmental coordination. Defence gives explicit recognition to cyber threats to national securities of NATO members and the Alliance itself. Much along the lines of proactive operations, the document identifies developing abilities to prevent, detect, and defend against cyber-attacks as part of its deterrence and defence mission. 73 In practical terms, NATO started planning a cyber defence programme. It envisaged creation of the Computer Incident Response Capability, which became fully operational in 2012. 74 Becoming proactive means that as a military alliance, NATO will develop minimum requirements for those national information systems that are critical for carrying out NATO's core tasks: assisting allies and other countries in achieving a minimum level of cyber defence to reduce the vulnerabilities to national critical infrastructure; offering help to any of its members should they find themselves a target of a cyber-attack; and enhancing early warning, situational awareness, and analysis capabilities. 75 Unlike the European Union and its rather reactive/defensive approach, based mainly on coordination between national Computer Incidents Response Teams (CITRs), NATO aims at becoming a proactive agent of cyber-security that operates alongside its member states and even sets benchmarks for member states to meet. Its stance is more than defensive, which emanates from its organizational structure and functional character.
Defensive vs Offensive Capabilities: The Functional Character of the EU
Brave New (Uncertain) World: New Threats and Old Responses
After months of preparatory work, the EU finally released its Cyber Security Strategy in The main aim is to provide EU law enforcement authorities with enhanced tools to fight cybercrime. It will include provisions for the use of specific software ('Botnets') as a method of comm1ttmg cybercrimes, making it a criminal offence and also increasing the maximum penalty for offenders. 79 The most interesting and yet unclear development (also in terms of academic research) is cyber defence policy and capabilities related to the framework of the CSDP. It remains to be seen what these declarations develop into in terms of real action plans and capabilities. New threats have the potential of facilitating CFSP cooperation beyond mere coordination. Since the nature of cyberspace makes traditional intergovernmental arrangements based on national sovereignty less effective, more could be achieved in the realm of cyber defence than has been gained so far in the four traditional domains of air, land, sea, and space.
Since cyberspace is by definition trans-border and transnational, any effective response should also evoke trans-border and transnational cooperation. At the same time, the cyber domain differs from other realms in that it is, partly at least, not physical. What is physical (mainly computer hardware) tends to be much cheaper in terms of Research and Development (R&D) and maintenance than traditional military equipment. Also, the IT know-how seems to be much more evenly spread between countries than, say, anti-ballistic missile technology.
Much more than Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), moreover, cyberspace knows no national border.
For the time being, however, the EU remains only a centre of coordination of some aspects of national digital security strategies. It focuses more on the safety of individuals and private companies or operators of critical infrastructure. 80 The next section of the article will elaborate on the possible solutions, listing five specific prescriptions.
Conclusion: The Way Forward amid Limitations and Uncertainties?
It seems likely that particular member states will dominate European action on cybersecurity challenges over a genuine common response. Major reasons start with the lack of a common definition of cyber-security among EU members, which spreads to further conceptual differences regarding related notions such as cyber-power, cyber defence and cyber-security strategy. On a more practical level it translates into problems with interoperability between various national cyber-security institutions as well as a lack of common understanding regarding the role of the state in cyber-security and by extension public-private partnership.
As Doug Stokes and Richard Whitman observe, 'Despite achievements that were unthinkable in the early post-Cold War years, the EU today fails to punch its true weight and to capitalize on its strengths. Why is this still the case?' 81 Two reasons are seen as pervasive: first, the lack of joined global policy whereby multilateral objectives are not effectively translated to bilateral partnerships, and vice versa; and second, the existing differences between member states regarding their relations with emerging powers. The European Union for all its achievements is still only a model of pooled sovereignty, more advanced in some areas than others. The execution of foreign and security policy is especially problematic, as this area still operates on an intergovernmental logic, which will continue in the coming years.
These same general weaknesses feature in EU cyber-security strategy. Behind this state of affairs is the lack of a truly pan-European vision of the role of the EU as an agent of cyber-security on the part of particular member states as well as the whole institution. What limits the European Union most in cyber-security is its intergovernmental character and the corresponding lack of collective vision on the part of member states.
Today, national authorities often seem committed to closer cooperation within the cyber domain, but in reality their commitment is limited and focused mainly on trade and communication-related aspects of cyber-security. The situation bears close resemblance to typical problems in the area of freedom, security, and justice (Justice and Home Affairs).
Beginning with cooperation under the Trevi process, later reinforced by the Treaty of Maastricht, obstruction by national authorities was seen when it came to sharing sensitive information and touching directly on national sovereignty concerns. 82 Much of the JHA area, from the outset, was complex, overburdened with national agencies and different national civil laws.
When implementing the EU Cyber Security Strategy, five major problems have to be resolved. Thirdly, the future EU cyber-security strategy should incorporate different forms of cyber-power, from compulsory through institutional, to structural and productive. Only a balanced combination of all four forms will allow a truly strategic approach. Europeans need to understand that the creeping threats to cyber-security continue to affect not only the security of their states but also the security of the whole EU, especially if it expects to be an important actor.
Fourthly, as Ronald Deibert, Rafal Rohozinski and Masashi Crete-Nishihara note in their study of the 2008 Georgia -Russia conflict, control of the physical infrastructure of cyberspace is critical strategically and tactically. 84 For European countries this is challenging because in free-market economies the role of the state, though varying from economy to economy, is limited. As Colin Crouch observes, contemporary Wes tern societies face the post-democracy phenomenon. 85 It is characterized by the withdrawal of the state from most of its functions and thus opening public goods, such as security, to private actors. 86 This creates pressure for EU policymakers to decisively define the role of the state and the EU in cyber-security. Thiswould probably mean 'Brusselization', often opposed by national governments. However, if the EU is to play a more prominent role in cyber-security in the future, there is probably no alternative. Consequently, private operators will also have to follow more detailed legislation that would stipulate their responsibilities in cases of security breaches (especially in case of Critical Infrastructure and cybercrime).
Finally, EU cyber-security strategy needs to clarify what is actually meant by cyber-security or cyber-security strategy. Contemporary understandings from ENISA seem to be sweeping and general, a challenge to developing operational capabilities. EU cyber-security strategy needs more than merely coordination of national actions. What is needed is supra-natural understanding of challenges and threats and the feasible tools to address them. Such an approach would further Europeanize state security policies, perhaps with the help of the spill-over that characterized European integration for so long. Similarly to the public-private partnership problems mentioned above, it is expected that there will emerge brakemen to any attempts at making concepts uniform. Perhaps, as in other policy areas, the EU will be the scene of a clash of interests between the drivers and brakemen. It is, however, also possible that the character of the cyber domain and threats to cyber-security will make a common response based on common concepts easier in the long run than, say, striking the balance between agricultural and cohesion policies.
The question of agency in the fifth domain has been usefully approached by Stuart Starr, who, referring to American cyber-security strategy, postulates that cyber-power should be seen as the ability to use cyberspace to create advantages and influence events in the other operational environments and across the instruments of power, especially military and informational levers of power. 87 We can debate the means that American decision-makers chose when designing their national cyber-security strategy. Equally, we should perhaps argue about their definition of cyberspace, cyber-power or cyber strategy. No one can deny, however, that the United State's agency in cyber domain is undeniable.
Analysing the EU and its cyber-security strategy, one naturally remains skeptical about EU agency in the cyber domain. The EU as a civilian power tends to focus on defensive rather than offensive elements of cyber-security in its approach and so its capacity to truly influence the myriad of actors and phenomena in the cyber domain remains limited. Correspondingly, the comparative underdevelopment of Common Foreign and Security Policy that stems from the intergovernmental character of the EU in this regard fixes it on civilian elements of cyber-security such as those relating to trade and communication. Unlike NATO, the European Union does not instil cooperation based on well-defined, focused, military-related functionality; it merely encourages generic coordination. In this respect the ENISA Good Practice Guide on National Cyber Security Strategies to broadly coordinate national cybersecurity strategies is only a first step on the long road that lies ahead. 88 
